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Nietzsche, Virtue, and the Horror of Existence
Philip J. Kain
Santa Clara University

Abstract
Robert Solomon argues that Nietzsche is committed to a virtue ethic like Aristotle's.
Solomon’s approach seems unaware of Nietzsche’s belief in the horror of existence. A
life that contains as much suffering as Nietzsche expects a life to contain, could not be
considered a good life by Aristotle. To go further, as Nietzsche does in his doctrines of
eternal recurrence and amor fati, to advocate loving such a fate, to refuse to change the
slightest detail, Aristotle would find debased. Nietzsche is committed to a virtue ethic,
but not an Aristotelian one.

I
It has been argued that Nietzsche is committed to a virtue ethic.1 Solomon, for
example, claims that Nietzsche is more like Aristotle than Kant. Aristotle’s ethics, he
holds, is not one of rules and principles—especially not universal ones. It is concerned
with excellence and is still involved with the Homeric warrior tradition. The purpose of
such an ethic is to maximize people’s potential and that will always be unequal for

Aristotle as well as Nietzsche. Solomon thinks Nietzsche wants to return to the values of
masterly virtue.2 The Übermensch is Aristotle’s megalopsychos—the great-souled man.3
I have argued in another paper that it is a mistake to see Nietzsche as returning to the
values of master morality.4 But further than that, Solomon’s whole approach seems
unaware of Nietzsche’s belief in the horror of existence. While Nietzsche might have
been impressed by Aristotle’s megalopsychos,5 Aristotle would be appalled by
Nietzsche’s Übermensch. A life that contains as much suffering as Nietzsche expects a
life to contain could not be considered a good life by Aristotle. To go further, as
Nietzsche does, to advocate loving such a fate, to refuse to change the slightest detail,
Aristotle would find debased—perhaps even demented. At any rate, the life of the
Übermensch is not a flourishing life in Aristotle’s sense. These claims will have to be
explained and defended.

II
At the center of Nietzsche's vision lies his concept of the "terror and horror of existence."6
As he puts it in The Birth of Tragedy:
"There is an ancient story that King Midas hunted in the forest a long time for the
wise Silenus, the companion of Dionysus….When Silenus at last fell into his hands, the
king asked what was the best and most desirable of all things for man. Fixed and
immovable, the demigod said not a word, till at last, urged by the king, he gave a shrill
laugh and broke out into these words: 'Oh, wretched ephemeral race, children of
chance and misery, why do you compel me to tell you what it would be most expedient
for you not to hear? What is best of all is utterly beyond your reach: not to be born,
not to be, to be nothing. But the second best for you is—to die soon.'"7
Why is it best never to have been born? Because all we can expect as human beings is
senseless suffering—suffering for no reason at all.8 In Nietzsche's view we live in an empty,
meaningless cosmos.9 We cannot look into reality without being overcome. Indeed, in Beyond
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Good and Evil, he even suggests that "it might be a basic characteristic of existence that those
who would know it completely would perish…"10
And it was not just intellectual reflection that led Nietzsche to a belief in the horror of
existence. He lived it himself. 11 In a letter of April 10, 1888, he writes:
Around 1876 my health grew worse….There were extremely painful and obstinate
headaches which exhausted all my strength. They increased over long years, to reach a
climax at which pain was habitual, so that any given year contained for me two hundred
days of pain….My specialty was to endure the extremity of pain…with complete
lucidity for two or three days in succession, with continuous vomiting of mucus.12
It is also Nietzsche’s view that if we look deeply into the essence of things, into the horror
of existence, we will be overwhelmed—paralyzed. Like Hamlet we will not be able to act,
because we see that action cannot change the eternal nature of things.13 We must realize,
Nietzsche says, that "a profound illusion…first saw the light of the world in the person of
Socrates: the unshakeable faith that thought…can penetrate the deepest abysses of being, and
that thought is capable not only of knowing being but even of correcting it. This sublime
metaphysical illusion accompanies science as an instinct…"14 In Nietzsche's view, we cannot
change things. Instead, with Hamlet we should "feel it to be ridiculous or humiliating that [we]
should be asked to set right a world that is out of joint."15
Knowledge of the horror of existence kills action. Action requires distance and illusion.
The horror and meaninglessness of existence must be veiled if we are to live and act. What we
must do, Nietzsche thinks, is construct a meaning for suffering. Suffering we can handle.
Meaningless suffering, suffering for no reason at all, we cannot handle. So we give it a
meaning. We invent a meaning. We create an illusion. The Greeks constructed gods for
whom wars and other forms of suffering were festival plays and thus an occasion to be
celebrated by the poets. Christians imagine a God for whom suffering is punishment for sin.16
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Even if we were to reject Nietzsche's view, even if we refuse to accept the notion that it is
impossible to significantly reduce suffering, the whole question may well become moot.
Nietzsche tells a story:
Once upon a time, in some out of the way corner of that universe which is dispersed
into numberless twinkling solar systems, there was a star upon which clever beasts
invented knowing. That was the most arrogant and mendacious minute of "world
history," but nevertheless, it was only a minute. After nature had drawn a few breaths,
the star cooled and congealed, and the clever beasts had to die.17
Whatever progress we might think we are making in reducing suffering, whatever change
we think we are bringing about, it may all amount to nothing more than a brief and accidental
moment in biological time, whose imminent disappearance will finally confirm the horror and
meaninglessness of existence.
I do not think we can dismiss Nietzsche's view simply because it goes counter to
mainstream assumptions. And we certainly cannot dismiss it if we hope to understand
Nietzsche.

III
Let us try to draw out the philosophical implications that follow from the horror of
existence. If existence really is horrible, if to know it completely, as Nietzsche suggests in
Beyond Good and Evil, means we are likely to perish,18 then knowledge of the truth cannot
be good for us. The horror of existence, if we think through its consequences, will put us
radically at odds with perhaps the most fundamental assumption of philosophy since Plato
and Aristotle, namely, that the true and the good coincide. Philosophers assume that the
truth—far from being harmful—will be good for us. And what is really good for us will
necessarily be something that is not an illusion or a lie but the truth. As Nietzsche puts it:
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"All supreme values are of the first rank, all the supreme concepts…the good, the
true….neither can these supreme concepts be incommensurate with one another, be
incompatible with one another…"19 Nietzsche also says, "I seek to understand out of what
idiosyncrasy that Socratic equation reason = virtue = happiness derives: that bizarrest of
equations and one which has in particular all the instincts of the older Hellenes against it."20
For Socrates, the true, the good, and also happiness coincide.
So also, in Book X of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle tells us that the highest
happiness is activity in accord with the highest excellence, that is, the contemplative activity
of the intellect.21 Why should intellectual activity necessarily make us happy? There is a
hidden assumption buried in Aristotle's argument. If we were to look back to Sophocles, it
would not at all be the case for him that the life of the intellect—theoretical wisdom—could
be expected to make us happy. Such wisdom would allow us to see more deeply into the
truth of things and thus to see what a miserable, terrible, and alien cosmos we live in. We
would see into the horror of existence. Sophocles too quotes the wisdom of Silenus. Best
never to have been born; second best, die as soon as possible. All we can expect in this
world is to suffer.22
This, obviously, is not Aristotle's view. In the Eudemian Ethics, Aristotle tells us,
approvingly, "that Anaxagoras answered a man who was…asking why one should choose
rather to be born than not by saying 'for the sake of viewing the heavens and the whole order
of the universe'."23 For Aristotle, "existence is to all men a thing to be chosen and loved…"24
For Aristotle, human beings fit the cosmos, they belong, they are at home. It is as if the
cosmos and human beings were designed for each other.
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For virtue to be compatible with happiness it is necessary that the individual acting
virtuously fit the world. We cannot be happy if we continually grate against existence. So
also, if knowing the truth about existence is to be compatible with happiness, the truth cannot
be that existence is horrible and terrifying. If to be happy, we must avoid knowing the truth,
if we must conceal it, if we must lie about it, then the true and the good are not compatible.
If the truth is that existence is horrible and terrifying, then the life of the intellect cannot
produce happiness, and the good for human beings cannot be the contemplative life of the
intellect. Truth, goodness, and happiness would not accord.
But for Aristotle they do accord. And for Plato, if we could free ourselves from our
chains, if we could climb up out of the cave, if we could get used to looking at the sun, we
would see that the idea of the good is not only compatible with, but is the very source of, the
true.25 The last thing we would want would be to return to the bottom of the cave.
Contemplating the true and the good, for Plato, would be the highest happiness.26 Here, the
truth is not horror and terror.
So also, the view of modern science is that human rationality can discover the truth, that
this is good for human beings, and that it will lead to overall progress for humanity, that is, to
increasing happiness.
Nietzsche rejects all of this: "For a philosopher to say, 'the good and the beautiful are
one,' is infamy; if he goes on to add, 'also the true,' one ought to thrash him. Truth is ugly.…
We possess art lest we perish of the truth."27 He also says, "There is no preestablished
harmony between the furthering of truth and the well-being," that is, the good, "of
humanity."28
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There is nothing Nietzsche would reject more, we might say, than Plato's allegory of the
cave.29 We cannot climb up out of the cave and look directly at the truth. It would probably
kill us. There is a reason why we are down in the cave with our backs to the truth. It is true
that the shadows at the bottom of the cave are illusions, distortions, lies. But it is not true
that the shadows lock us into a prison. They keep out the horror. They preserve life. Life
exists, only exists, at the bottom of the cave.
The truth is not good for human beings—the truth is horror. Reality as it truly is, is not
beautiful—it is terrifying. To pursue the truth, far from pursuing the good and achieving
happiness, as most all philosophers have assumed, would have the consequence of plunging
humankind into the abyss, of rubbing their noses in the horror of existence. Life requires
lies, illusion, art, veiling. Life must shun the truth. Life is not possible with the truth. To
pursue the good, what is best for human beings, requires rejection of the true.30
One might try to respond that while it is obviously the case that some things are not good
for us, nevertheless, knowing the truth is always good for us. It is certainly best for us to
know what is bad, dangerous, threatening, and so forth. It might help us to avoid such things.
But if existence is truly alien, if to come to know the truth means we are likely to perish, if it
is at odds with human life, if existence is ontologically horrible (not just occasionally
irritating), then Jocasta is right, knowing the truth is not good for us.31 That is the subversive
proposition Nietzsche wants to force us to think about.

IV
Nietzsche embraces the doctrine of eternal recurrence for the first time in The Gay Science:
The greatest weight.—What, if some day or night a demon were to steal after you
into your loneliest loneliness and say to you: "This life as you now live it and have
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lived it, you will have to live once more and innumerable times more; and there will be
nothing new in it, but every pain and every joy and every thought and sigh and
everything unutterably small or great in your life will have to return to you, all in the
same succession and sequence—even this spider and this moonlight between the trees,
and even this moment and I myself. The eternal hourglass of existence is turned upside
down again and again, and you with it, speck of dust!"
Would you not throw yourself down and gnash your teeth and curse the demon who
spoke thus? Or have you once experienced a tremendous moment when you would
have answered him: "You are a god and never have I heard anything more divine." If
this thought gained possession of you, it would change you as you are or perhaps crush
you. The question in each and every thing, "Do you desire this once more and
innumerable times more?" would lie upon your actions as the greatest weight. Or how
well disposed would you have to become to yourself and to life to crave nothing more
fervently than this ultimate eternal confirmation and seal?32
It is not enough that eternal recurrence simply be believed. Nietzsche demands that it
actually be loved. In Ecce Homo, he explains his doctrine of amor fati: "My formula for
greatness in a human being is amor fati: that one wants nothing to be different, not forward,
not backward, not in all eternity. Not merely bear what is necessary, still less conceal it…but
love it."33 In Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Nietzsche says: "To redeem those who lived in the past
and to recreate all 'it was' into a 'thus I willed it'—that alone should I call redemption."34 To
turn all "it was" into a "thus I willed it" is to accept fate fully, to love it. One would have it no
other way; one wants everything eternally the same, "'Was that life?….Well then! Once
more!'"35
How are we to understand these doctrines? The first thing we must do is notice that the
philosopher who introduces eternal recurrence and amor fati is the very same philosopher who
also believes in the horror and terror of existence—a point that is never emphasized by
commentators. Lou Salomé tells us that Nietzsche spoke to her of eternal recurrence only
"with a quiet voice and with all signs of deepest horror….Life, in fact, produced such suffering
in him that the certainty of an eternal return of life had to mean something horrifying to him."36
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Imagine yourself with the worst migraine possible. Imagine yourself in a feverish state
experiencing violent nausea and continuous vomiting. Imagine that this sort of thing has been
going on for years and years, and that you have been unable to do anything about it. Extreme
care with your diet, concern for climate, continuous experimenting with medicines, all
accomplish nothing. You are unable to cure yourself. You have been unable even to improve
your condition.37 You have no expectation of ever doing so. Suppose this state has led you to
see, or perhaps merely confirmed your insight into, the horror and terror of existence. It has
led you to think that Silenus was right. Best never to have been born. Second best, die as soon
as possible. All you can expect is suffering, suffering for no reason at all, meaningless
suffering. You have even thought of suicide.38 Now imagine that at your worst moment, your
loneliest loneliness, a demon appears to you, or you imagine a demon appearing to you. And
this demon tells you that you will have to live your life over again, innumerable times more,
and that everything, every last bit of pain and suffering, every last migraine, every last bout of
nausea and vomiting, will return, exactly the same, over and over and over again.
What would your reaction be? If your reaction were to be negative, no one would bat an
eye. But what if your reaction was, or came to be, positive? What if you were able to love
your life so completely that you would not want to change a single moment—a single moment
of suffering? What if you were to come to crave nothing more fervently than the eternal
recurrence of every moment of your life? What if you were to see this as an ultimate
confirmation and seal, nothing more divine? How could you do this? Why would you do this?
Why wouldn't it be madness? What is going on here? How has this been overlooked by all the
commentators? This cries out for explanation.
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Eternal recurrence, I think we can say, shows us the horror of existence. No matter what
you say about your life, no matter how happy you claim to have been, no matter how bright a
face you put on it, the threat of eternal recurrence brings out the basic horror in any life. Live
it over again with nothing new? It is the 'nothing new' that does it. That is how we make it
through our existing life. We hope for, we expect, something new, something different, some
improvement, some progress, or at least some distraction, some hope. If that is ruled out, if
everything will be exactly the same in our next life, well that is a different story. If you find
people who claims to be supremely happy with their life, just see what happens if they start to
think that they will have to live it again.
Suppose that you can, as Aristotle suggests, look back over your life as a whole and feel
that it was a good one—a happy one. Would that make you want to live it again? Would you
at the moment in which you feel that your life was a happy one also "crave nothing more
fervently" than to live it again? What if your life was a joyous life or a proud life? It is quite
clear isn't it that you could have a very positive attitude toward your life, and not at all want to
live it again? In fact, wouldn't the prospect of eternal repetition, if the idea grew upon you and
gained possession of you, begin to sap even the best life of its attractiveness? Wouldn't the
expectation of eternal repetition make anything less appealing? Wouldn't it empty your life of
its significance and meaning? Most commentators seem to assume that the only life we could
expect anyone to want to live again would be a good life. That makes no sense at all to me.
On the other hand, most would assume that a life of intense pain and suffering is not at all the
sort of life it makes any sense to want to live again. I think Nietzsche was able to see that a life
of intense pain and suffering is perhaps the only life it really makes sense to want to live again.
This requires explanation.
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For years Nietzsche was ill, suffering intense migraines, nausea, and vomiting. Often he
was unable to work and confined to bed. He fought this. He tried everything. He sought a
better climate. He watched his diet fanatically. He experimented with medicines. Nothing
worked. He could not improve his condition. His suffering was out of his control. It
dominated his life and determined his every activity. He was overpowered by it. There was no
freedom or dignity here. He became a slave to his illness. He was subjugated by it. What was
he to do?
At the beginning of the essay, "Concerning the Sublime," Schiller wrote:
nothing is so beneath the dignity of a human being as to suffer
violence….whoever cowardly suffers it, tosses his humanity aside….Every
human being finds himself in this position. He is surrounded by countless
forces, all superior to him and all playing the master over him.…If he can no
longer oppose physical forces with a corresponding physical force, then nothing
else remains for him to do to avoid suffering violence than to do completely
away with a relation so deleterious to him and to destroy conceptually a brute
force that he in fact must endure. However, to destroy a force conceptually
means nothing other than to submit to it voluntarily.39
While Nietzsche does not go about it in the way Schiller had in mind, nevertheless,
this is exactly what Nietzsche does. What was he to do about his suffering? What was
he to do about the fact that it came to dominate every moment of his life? What was he
to do about the fact that it was robbing him of all freedom and dignity? What was he to
do about this subjugation and slavery? He decided to submit to it voluntarily. He
decided to accept it fully. He decided that he would not change a single detail of his life,
not one moment of pain. He decided to love his fate. At the prospect of living his life
over again, over again an infinite number of times, without the slightest change, with
every detail of suffering and pain, he was ready to say, "Well then! Once more!'"40 He
could not change his life anyway. But this way he broke the psychological stranglehold it
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had over him. He ended his subjugation. He put himself in charge. He turned all "it
was" into a "thus I willed it." Everything that was going to happen in his life, he
accepted, he chose, he willed. He became sovereign over his life. There was no way to
overcome his illness except by embracing it.

V
Let us now turn our attention to virtue. While it can easily be shown that Nietzsche
believes in virtue, I do not think he believes in ordinary virtue. He says: "One should
defend virtue against the preachers of virtue: they are its worst enemies. For they teach
virtue as an ideal for everyone; they take from virtue the charm of rareness,
inimitableness, exceptionalness and unaverageness—its aristocratic magic."41 In Beyond
Good and Evil, he also says: "It is probable that we, too, still have our virtues, although
in all fairness they will not be the simpleminded and foursquare virtues for which we
hold our grandfathers in honor—and at arms length."42 Nietzsche thinks that "each one
of us should devise his own virtue…"43
He says that he is "actually the very opposite of the type of man who so far has been
revered as virtuous."44 In fact, he thinks that any virtue "becomes a virtue through rising
against that blind power of the factual and tyranny of the actual.…It always swims
against the tide of history…"45 This suggests that a figure like King Vishvamitra, who
Nietzsche describes in the Genealogy of Morals, could be a model for the development of
virtue:
As men of frightful ages, they did this by using frightful means: cruelty toward
themselves, inventive self-castigation—this was the principal means these powerhungry hermits and innovators of ideas required to overcome the gods and
tradition in themselves, so as to be able to believe in their own innovations. I
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recall the famous story of King Vishvamitra, who through millennia of selftorture acquired such a feeling of power and self-confidence that he endeavored to
build a new heaven—the uncanny symbol of the most ancient and most recent
experience of philosophers on earth: whoever has at some time built a "new
heaven" has found the power to do so only in his own hell.46
To overthrow the tyranny of the actual, to overcome the gods and tradition, one must
develop new powers, new self-confidence, new capacities, new virtues. We must:
confront our inherited and hereditary nature with our knowledge, and through a
new, stern discipline combat our inborn heritage and implant in ourselves a new
habit, a new instinct, a second nature, so that our first nature withers away. It is
an attempt to give oneself, as it were a posteriori, a past in which one would like
to originate in opposition to that in which one did originate…47
The old virtues are at odds with the type of person Nietzsche wants to realize. This
person will require the development of new and different virtues. It is even the case that:
"what is good and evil no one knows yet, unless it be he who creates. He, however,
creates man’s goal and gives the earth its meaning and its future. That anything at all is
good and evil—that is his creation."48 Only when a Vishvamitra has created a new
heaven, that is, a new meaning structure, a new moral paradigm, will we be able to tell
what is good and evil and develop new virtues accordingly.
A virtue ethic is capable of asking what is good for a certain type of person, rather
than what is good for everyone or for the majority, and it can take what is good for this
person as good. Nietzsche thinks that as we move past the ancient world, as we move
through Christianity and into the modern world, we move further and further from
understanding good in this way. We understand it more and more as the utilitarian
does—as what benefits the greatest number. Nietzsche wants to return to the question of
what is good for a certain type of person. In this respect Solomon is quite correct in
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claiming that Nietzsche is much the same as Aristotle. But I do not think that Nietzsche
and Aristotle have in mind anything like the same type of person.
Aristotelian virtue is completely at odds with Nietzsche’s vision of the horror of
existence and the need to conceal it. If we ask the simplest of questions, if we ask how
we should value the traditional virtue of truthfulness, we quickly see that Nietzsche and
Aristotle would be deeply opposed. For Nietzsche, we cannot give anything like the
traditional answer, the answer Aristotle’s would certainly give. For Nietzsche, we need
illusion, we need art, we need lies.49 We must conceal the truth—the horror of existence.
The Übermensch must build up the power to create a grand illusion.50 We do not, for
Nietzsche, live in a world where the good and the true will agree. The truth is that reality
is horrible—not good. If we seek what is good for us, if we seek human well-being, if we
seek a flourishing life, if we seek happiness, we must shun the true. Traditional morality,
however, assumes that the good and the true coincide. If the good does not coincide with
the true, if we must choose between the good and the true, then we cannot have anything
like an Aristotelian virtue ethic. If virtues are characteristics, dispositions, or powers that
enable us to do what is good for us, and if this must leave out what is true, indeed, even
serve to hide what is true,51 then we cannot have anything like an Aristotelian notion of
virtue. For Aristotle, if we develop a characteristic or power that works to hide the true,
it would not be a virtue but a vice. For Aristotle, "reasoning must be true and the desire
right, if the choice is to be good…"52 If, however, the true is horrible, if it is terrible, then
characteristics or powers that enable us to hide the true, characteristics that would
normally be called vices, become virtues.53
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Nietzsche is definitely committed to a virtue ethic. He attends to characteristics,
dispositions, and powers that he wants developed in individuals (at least some
individuals), but the characteristics he values, that he takes to be good, that he takes to be
virtues, are not ones that enable us to find the true or to live in accord with it.54 Rather,
Nietzsche seeks the very opposite, powers that hide the true, that make life possible,
powers that would normally be called vices. Thus, in Will to Power, he says:
Let us not hide from ourselves this most curious result: I have imparted to virtue
a new charm—the charm of something forbidden.…Only after we have
recognized everything as lies and appearance do we regain the right to this fairest
of falsehoods, virtue.…only by exhibiting virtue as a form of immorality do we
again justify it…it is part of the fundamental immorality of all existence…the
haughtiest, dearest and rarest form of vice.55
It is true that Nietzsche seeks the sorts of virtues that would empower the great man
or the Übermensch and allow him to flourish. But this is a radically different kind of
flourishing than Aristotle had in mind. As MacIntyre puts it, for Aristotle, virtues enable
us to realize our true nature and reach our true end.56 In realizing our nature, in becoming
what we should become, in realizing our true end, we will achieve our good, that is, we
will flourish and be happy. This implies and requires a fit between the human essence
and the world. It is as if they were designed for each other—certainly they cannot be
alien and opposed to each other. For Nietzsche, this is ridiculous. To realize our nature
as Aristotle understands nature, to achieve our good as Aristotle understands good, that
is, a good that accords with the true, far from allowing us to flourish, far from making us
happy, would plunge us into the horror and terror of existence. We live in an alien and
hostile cosmos and we need lies to conceal this fact from ourselves.
Moreover, we need the power to create and maintain these illusions. Such powers are
virtues. They build a certain kind of character. They build a disposition. They enable
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one to function in a certain way. To this extent we have a virtue ethic. But it does not
realize our essence. If, for Nietzsche, we can even be said to have an essence, it would be
some sort of Dionysian chaos, and the task of any virtue would be to conceal it, not
realize it.57 As far as our true end goes, if we can in any way be said to have one, it
would be horror and terror, something we do not want to realize, something we want to
conceal.
If we can look back over our entire life and say it was a good one, then, for Aristotle,
it was a happy life. If in looking back over our entire life, we must instead admit that it
was a life of horrible and meaningless suffering, then, for Aristotle, it would be
impossible to say it was a happy life.58 If it is necessary to lie, to live in illusion, in order
to conceal this meaningless suffering, then, for Aristotle, it would be impossible to say it
was a good life.
What if, however, one was able to look back over such a life and was able to love it?
What if one would not be willing to change a single moment of suffering? Would that
make one's life a happy one? Certainly not for Aristotle. Nietzsche, at least at times, will
suggest that it could.59 But what does he mean by happiness? Certainly not the good life
in Aristotle's sense. Happiness is understood as power,60 or is replaced by power.61 In
the Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche says:
Every animal—therefore la bête philosophe, too—instinctively strives for an
optimum of favorable conditions under which it can expend all its strength and
achieve its maximal feeling of power….(I am not speaking of its path to
happiness, but its path to power…and in most cases actually its path to
unhappiness).62

16

Virtue, for Aristotle, allows us to fit with reality, be at home, and be happy. Virtue,
for Nietzsche, allows us to construct a new heaven, conceal an alien cosmos, and
experience the satisfaction of power—not happiness.
Something is a virtue for Aristotle if it contributes to living a good life, a happy life.
Something is a virtue for Nietzsche if it enables you to love your fate, live with suffering,
not want to change a single moment:
Every basic character trait that is encountered at the bottom of every event, that
finds expression in every event, would have to lead every individual who
experienced it as his own basic character trait to welcome every moment of
universal existence with a sense of triumph. The crucial point would be that one
experienced this basic character trait in oneself as good, valuable—with
pleasure.63
If you look back over your life, for Nietzsche, you do not ask the same question
Aristotle would have you ask. You do not ask if it was a good life, let alone the best life.
If you ask that, you would immediately see that any life could be improved by changing
this or adding that. To dwell on such concerns, however, would threaten to re-enslave
you to your suffering. Instead, you must have unqualified love for every detail of your
life.64 Why? Not because every detail deserves it, not because your life was the best life
in Aristotle's sense, not because it could not be made better in Aristotle's sense, but
because if you do not, then the pain and suffering of your life could begin to reassert
itself, eat away at you, subjugate you. If you do not love every moment of your life,
those moments you do not love, may begin to reassert their psychological stranglehold.
They may begin to dominate you. You will begin to wish you did not have to suffer
through so many of them, you will try to develop strategies for coping with them, you
will worry about them, and pretty soon you may again be enslaved by them. Your
attitude toward any moment cannot be a desire to avoid it, change it, reduce it—or it may
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begin to dominate you.65 Such love, Aristotle would consider abject and degrading.
Aristotle would completely reject the Übermensch.
On the other hand, though, if in looking back over your life, for Aristotle, you were to
find it a good one, a happy one, even the best life, there would be nothing about it that
would necessarily make you want to live it again. And if one day you were informed by
the demon that you had to live it again over and over an infinite number of times, even
Aristotle, as this idea gained possession of him, might "throw [him]self down and gnash
[his] teeth and curse the demon who spoke thus…"66
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